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To determine the extent and pattern of inﬂ  uenza trans-
mission and effectiveness of containment measures, we 
investigated dual outbreaks of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and 
inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) that had occurred on a cruise ship in 
May 2009. Of 1,970 passengers and 734 crew members, 
82 (3.0%) were infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, 
98 (3.6%) with inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) virus, and 2 (0.1%) with 
both. Among 45 children who visited the ship’s childcare 
center, infection rate for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was higher 
than that for inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) viruses. Disembarked pas-
sengers reported a high level of compliance with isolation 
and quarantine recommendations. We found 4 subsequent 
cases epidemiologically linked to passengers but no evi-
dence of sustained transmission to the community or pas-
sengers on the next cruise. Among this population of gener-
ally healthy passengers, children seemed more susceptible 
to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 than to inﬂ  uenza (H3N2) viruses. 
Intensive disease control measures successfully contained 
these outbreaks.
D
uring April 2009, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza) virus began to circulate worldwide. In Aus-
tralia, public health efforts were initially focused on de-
laying the entry of the virus into the country. By May 24, 
2009, a total of 14 cases had been identiﬁ  ed nationally, 2 
in New South Wales (NSW), and all were associated with 
international travel.
On May 24, the Australian Quarantine Inspection Ser-
vice reported that 6 passengers of a cruise ship had respi-
ratory symptoms, and a point-of-care test showed positive 
inﬂ  uenza A virus results for all. The ship had departed from 
Sydney on a 10-day cruise in the Paciﬁ  c Ocean on May 16 
(cruise A) and stopped at 2 islands, neither of which had re-
ported circulation of pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus. None of the 
sick passengers had been in countries known to be affected 
by this inﬂ  uenza strain in the week before boarding. Thus, 
with no reason to suspect that the pandemic strain was cir-
culating on board, passengers were allowed to disembark in 
Sydney on May 25.
On May 25, the 4 available respiratory samples tak-
en from sick passengers were quickly couriered to the 
South Eastern Area Laboratory Service (the major public 
health viral laboratory serving eastern Sydney) for inﬂ  u-
enza virus nucleic acid testing (NAT) by real-time reverse 
transcription  –PCR (RT-PCR). Of these 4 samples, 2 were 
positive for pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus and 2 were positive 
for inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) (seasonal inﬂ  uenza) virus.
In response, NSW Health requested that all passengers 
(1,963 from Australia and 7 from elsewhere) who were ex-
periencing inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) isolate themselves 
from healthy persons and that all asymptomatic passengers 
quarantine themselves for 7 days after disembarkation (or 
7 days after onset of symptoms if they developed). This ad-
vice was communicated to passengers on the day of disem-
barkation through media alerts, the NSW Health website, 
and telephone information lines. Subsequently, passengers 
were contacted by telephone to ensure that they understood 
containment measures (how to prevent virus spread). Osel-
tamivir treatment (75 mg 2×/d for 5 days) was recommend-
ed for passengers or crew members with ILI (deﬁ  ned as 
>2 of the following: cough, fever, runny nose, or blocked 
nose) within 48 hours of onset and oseltamivir prophylaxis 
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(75 mg 1×/d for 10 days) for those in close contact with 
patients with laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases.
On May 25, all crew members were assessed for ill-
ness. Symptomatic members were isolated on shore, and 
the rest were given oseltamivir prophylaxis and continued 
to serve on the ship’s next voyage (cruise B), which depart-
ed later the same day. Cruise B traveled along the northern 
coast of Australia for 7 days and made a short stop at Bris-
bane before returning to Sydney on June 1. To minimize 
the risk for infection, enhanced cleaning regimens were 
conducted before cruise B, and NSW Health sent a public 
health doctor on the cruise to conduct intense surveillance 
for symptomatic passengers and crew.
Outbreaks of inﬂ  uenza have previously been reported 
on cruise ships (1–6), but the circumstances and extent of 
transmission have not been well documented. The cocircu-
lation of pandemic and seasonal inﬂ  uenza viruses on cruise 
ship A provided a unique opportunity to compare symp-
toms, severity, and attack rates of pandemic and seasonal 
strains. We describe our outbreak investigation, compare 
the epidemiology of the 2 inﬂ  uenza virus subtypes, and ex-
plore effectiveness of control measures.
Methods
Case Deﬁ  nition
We deﬁ  ned a conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza A case as illness in a 
cruise A passenger in whom inﬂ  uenza A virus was detected 
by NAT during the cruise or within 7 days after disem-
barkation (regardless of symptoms). A case of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza was deﬁ  ned as illness in a person with positive 
RT-PCR results for that virus. Further subtyping was con-
ducted for 44 of 100 patients with positive inﬂ  uenza A but 
negative pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus results by NAT; all had 
positive results for seasonal inﬂ  uenza virus. Consequent-
ly, we deﬁ  ned a case of seasonal inﬂ  uenza as illness in a 
person with positive inﬂ  uenza A virus results by NAT but 
negative pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus results and in whom in-
ﬂ  uenza subtyping for seasonal inﬂ  uenza virus by RT-PCR 
either produced positive results or was not conducted. A 
primary case was deﬁ  ned as illness in the ﬁ  rst person in 
a cabin to report ILI symptoms; a co-primary case, as ill-
ness in a person who reported symptom onset within 24 
hours after a primary case; and a secondary case, as illness 
in a person whose symptoms developed >24 hours after 
symptom onset in the primary case-patient. Case-patients 
were considered infectious for 24 hours before and 7 days 
after symptom onset. For the childcare center investiga-
tion, children who remained asymptomatic throughout the 
cruise were considered susceptible to inﬂ  uenza infection at 
each childcare session attended. Children in whom ILI de-
veloped were considered susceptible before the infectious 
period began.
Case Detection
We obtained a list of the names, sex, dates of birth, 
nationality, contact details, and cabin numbers of all pas-
sengers and crew members on cruise A. We reviewed the 
cruise ship’s medical records to ﬁ  nd passengers who had 
sought treatment for ILI during cruises A and B. Isolated 
symptomatic passengers from cruise A were referred to 
nearby hospitals for testing. Quarantined asymptomatic 
passengers were asked to report if symptoms developed; if 
so, laboratory testing was conducted. Crew members and 
passengers on cruise B were asked to immediately report 
fever or respiratory symptoms to medical staff and were 
tested for inﬂ  uenza by at least 2 point-of-care tests taken 
>24 hours apart. In all 8 Australian states and territories, 
public health legislation requires diagnostic laboratories to 
report conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza cases to the jurisdictional health 
department (7). The names of inﬂ  uenza case-patients re-
ported after completion of cruise A were checked against 
the ship’s manifest.
Data Collection
Because the investigation was part of a public health 
control initiative, formal ethics committee review was not 
required. Experienced public health staff interviewed case-
patients at the time of diagnosis and used a standardized 
questionnaire to determine symptoms, hospitalization sta-
tus, and oseltamivir use. This information was entered into 
a statewide database. Passengers who shared a cabin with 
case-patients who had pandemic inﬂ  uenza were also inter-
viewed about respiratory symptoms. Laboratory testing ini-
tially focused on identifying pandemic inﬂ  uenza cases by 
using the speciﬁ  c RT-PCR; samples determined negative 
for pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus by NAT were tested for inﬂ  u-
enza A (including seasonal inﬂ  uenza virus) several weeks 
after passengers had disembarked.
 Approximately 6 weeks after disembarking, all 50 
passengers who had had pandemic inﬂ  uenza were rein-
terviewed about the duration and severity of their illness. 
These passengers included 3 interstate residents who had 
been treated in NSW (and excluded 28 non–NSW case-
patients as a convenience sample) and the 45 NSW case-
patients who had seasonal inﬂ  uenza (excluding 55 non-
NSW case-patients and 17 NSW case-patients for whom 
test results were not available at the time of interview). 
Ultimately, 62 cases of seasonal inﬂ  uenza were identiﬁ  ed 
among NSW passengers; complete symptom data from 50 
passengers who were interviewed at the time of diagnosis 
were recorded in the statewide database.
Childcare Center Investigation
On-board childcare activities were provided in 3 daily 
sessions (9:00 AM   –10:00  PM) in 3 areas of the ship for 3 
age groups: 3–6, 7–12, and >13 years of age. Because the 
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pandemic outbreak appeared to begin in and primarily af-
fect children 3–6 years of age, the epidemiologic investi-
gation focused on this group. Most childcare activities for 
this group took place in 1 room. We examined childcare 
attendance records for this group and, ≈6 weeks after dis-
embarkation, interviewed the parents of all children in this 
group about symptoms, vaccination history, and composi-
tion of the traveling group. All specimens collected from 
childcare attendees were tested for pandemic and seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza subtypes.
Compliance Assessment
To assess compliance with isolation and quarantine rec-
ommendations, we interviewed all 66 households in which 
at least 1 person with pandemic inﬂ  uenza was isolated, 32 
NSW households with at least 1 person with seasonal in-
ﬂ  uenza, and 45 randomly selected quarantined NSW pas-
sengers. (NSW passengers were selected as a convenience 
sample.) Interviews were conducted by experienced public 
health interviewers who used a standardized questionnaire.
Laboratory Investigation
NAT detection of pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus was per-
formed by using real-time RT-PCR with primers targeting 
the hemagglutinin gene of the pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus pro-
vided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and 
following recommended protocol or by using an in-house 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus–speciﬁ  c real-time RT-PCR. Sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza virus was identiﬁ  ed by using a 2-target RT-
PCR containing primers targeting pandemic and seasonal 
inﬂ   uenza virus strains (Unité de Génétique Moléculaire 
des Virus Respiratoires, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France) or a 
commercial inﬂ  uenza A subtyping assay (Easy-Plex Inﬂ  u-
enza proﬁ  le 6; AusDiagnostics, Sydney, NSW, Australia).
Statistical Analyses
We analyzed data by using Epi Info version 3.5.1 
(www.cdc.gov/epiinfo). Relative risks were used to com-
pare age (as a categorical variable split into 7 groups), sex, 
and place of residence. Fisher exact test results were used 
for cell sizes <5. A Mantel-Haenszel value of p<0.05 was 
considered signiﬁ  cant. χ2 tests were used to compare pro-
portions. To compare the rates of pandemic and seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza infection in childcare attendees, the number of 
sessions a child attended while susceptible were summed, 
and cases per child-sessions at risk and exact Poisson con-
ﬁ  dence intervals were calculated. Nonoverlapping conﬁ  -
dence intervals were considered signiﬁ  cantly different.
Results
A total of 1,970 passengers and 734 crew members 
were on cruise A. Median age of passengers was 46 years 
(range 1–94 years), 57% were female, and most were from 
Australia (Table 1). Median age of crew members was 31 
years (range 19–62 years), and most were born overseas (not 
in Australia). ILI developed in 13 (0.7%) passengers who 
sought medical attention during the cruise; and inﬂ  uenza A 
results from point-of-care testing were positive for 6. NAT 
of samples from persons who were sick during the cruise or 
during the 7 days after disembarkation showed positive pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza virus results for 76 (3.9%), positive seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza results for 98 (5.0%), and positive co-infection re-
sults for 2 (0.1%). ILI in the 7 days before disembarkation 
was reported by 15 (2.0%) crew members; NAT showed 
positive pandemic inﬂ   uenza results for 3 crew members 
and positive seasonal inﬂ  uenza results for none. These crew 
members were isolated on shore. The remaining 719 crew 
members were given oseltamivir prophylaxis and contin-
ued to work during cruise B; among these, 5 reported ILI 
(all within 24 hours of cruise B departing), and 3 had posi-
tive NAT results for pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus. Therefore, 
20 (2.7%) crew members from cruise A reported ILI, and 6 
(0.8%) of these had positive pandemic inﬂ  uenza test results; 
none had positive seasonal inﬂ  uenza test results. Given the 
relatively low attack rate for the crew, we focused further 
investigation on the passengers, among whom the attack rate 
for pandemic inﬂ  uenza was highest for children 3–6 years 
of age, followed by children 7–12 years of age. For seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza, the attack rate was similar among children in all 
age groups (Table 1).
Symptoms and Severity of Illness
In total, 2 (3%) patients with pandemic inﬂ  uenza and 
8 (8%) patients with seasonal inﬂ  uenza were hospitalized 
(p = 0.16); none died. Among the 50 passengers with the 
pandemic strain and 50 with the seasonal strain who were 
interviewed, symptoms were similar, although coryza was 
reported signiﬁ  cantly more often by those with pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza (Table 2). Duration of illness was similar for pas-
sengers with either strain, but a higher proportion of sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza patients reported that illness was severe 
enough to limit their activities.
Epidemiologic Investigation
According to date of symptom onset, the pandemic in-
ﬂ  uenza outbreak began in the childcare center on May 18, 
which was 2 days after embarkation, and peaked on May 
25, the ﬁ  nal day of cruise A. The ﬁ  rst reported seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza case was in an adult whose symptoms began on 
May 17; the second, seemingly unrelated, infection devel-
oped in a childcare attendee on May 21. The number of 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza cases also peaked on May 25 (Figure).
Childcare Center Investigation
Of the 48 passengers 3–6 years of age, 45 (94%) at-
tended childcare. Among these 45 were 8 pairs of siblings. 
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One child received seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccine in 2008 and 
no child received the vaccine in 2009. The ﬁ  rst case of pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza was in a child from Victoria, Australia, 
in whom symptoms developed on the third day of cruise 
A. The child attended childcare for 4 sessions while infec-
tious. After the index case was identiﬁ  ed, 19 additional 
cases of pandemic inﬂ  uenza were identiﬁ  ed (including in 
2 sets of siblings: 2 related children in whom symptoms 
developed at the same time and in 1 child in whom ILI 
developed 2 days after symptom onset in her sibling); all 
but 1 had attended the childcare while a known infectious 
case-patient was present. The ﬁ  rst child for whom seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza was diagnosed had attended childcare the after-
noon and evening before symptom onset on May 21 and 
for 6 sessions while symptomatic. Subsequently, an addi-
tional 3 unrelated cases of seasonal inﬂ  uenza were identi-
ﬁ  ed among childcare attendees. The 3 children who did not 
attend childcare remained healthy.
Among the 45 childcare attendees, NAT results for 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza were positive for 18, for seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza were positive for 2, and for both were positive for 2. 
ILI developed in an additional 10 children, but these chil-
dren had negative inﬂ  uenza results by NAT; ILI developed 
in another 6 children who were not tested. Of these 16 chil-
dren, 8 had traveling companions with positive pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza virus results and 2 had travelling companions 
with positive seasonal inﬂ  uenza virus results. The remain-
ing 7 children remained asymptomatic. Of the 45 children 
who attended childcare, 44 attended concurrently with an 
infectious pandemic inﬂ  uenza case-patient and 43 attended 
concurrently with an infectious seasonal inﬂ  uenza case-pa-
tient. Considering the number of sessions attended by sus-
ceptible children, we determined that the risk for pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza infection was signiﬁ  cantly higher (19 cases from 
344 sessions = 0.055 child-sessions at risk, 95% conﬁ  dence 
interval [CI] 0.033–0.086) than was the risk for seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza (3 cases from 279 sessions = 0.011 child-sessions 
at risk, 95% CI 0.002–0.031).
Secondary Attack Rates for Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza
A total of 66 pandemic inﬂ  uenza case-patients in 53 
cabins were infectious while on cruise A. Excluding the co-
primary case-patients, 91 passengers shared a cabin with 
an infectious primary case-patient. Of these 91 passengers, 
symptoms developed in 50 (55%). Of these 50 case-pa-
tients, 34 were tested and 12 (35%) had positive pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza results. The secondary attack rate for those <12 
years of age (16/21) was signiﬁ  cantly higher than for those 
>12 years of age (34/70) (76% vs. 49%; p = 0.03). Of the 
66 case-patients, 1 received oseltamivir treatment within 
48 hours of symptom onset. Information about provision 
of oseltamivir prophylaxis was available for 34 (83%) of 
41 asymptomatic contacts. Of these, 3 (75%) of 4 children 
<12 years of age and 17 (57%) of 30 children >12 years 
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Table 1. Demographics for passengers with influenza after 10-day cruise that departed Sydney, NSW, Australia, on May 16, 2009* 
Demographic 
No. (%) passengers,  
n = 1,970 
Confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009, n = 78  Confirmed influenza A (H3N2), n = 100 
No. (%)  RR (95% CI)  p value  No. (%)  RR (95% CI)  p value 
Age group, y
 <3  13 (1)  0 0 1.00 1 (1)  1.52 (0.23–10.16)  0.67
 3–6  48 (2)  20 (26)  17.43 (10.45–29.09)  <0.001  4 (4)  1.64 (0.62–4.36)  0.32
 7–12  119 (6)  13 (17)  4.57 (2.40–8.69)  <0.001  6 (6)  1.00 (0.44–2.27)  0.99
 13–18  114 (6)  2 (3)  0.73 (0.18–3.06)  1.00 5 (5)  0.87 (0.35–2.12)  0.75
 19–35  369 (19)  18 (23)  2.04 (1.13–3.70)  0.020  19 (19)  1.02 (0.61–1.69)  0.95
 36–65  1,046 (53)  25 (32)  Referent  – 53 (53)  Referent  –
 >65  261 (13)  0 0.00 (undefined)  0.005  12 (12)  0.91 (0.50–1.70)  0.76
Sex
 M  842 (43)  35 (45)  Referent  47 (47)  Referent 
 F  1,128 (57)  43 (55)  0.92 (0.59–1.42)  0.70 53 (53)  1.19 (0.60–1.2)  0.38
Residence
 NSW  1,135 (58)  47 (60)  Referent  – 62 (62)  Referent  –
 Victoria  433 (22)  11 (14)  1.12† (0.72–1.74)  0.63 16 (16)  0.83† (0.56–1.24)  0.36
 QLD  165 (8)  10 (13)  12 (12) 
 SA  109 (6)  4 (5)  4 (4) 
 WA  54 (3)  0 4 (4) 
 ACT  39 (2)  3 (4)  1 (1) 
 Tasmania  12 (1)  1 (1)  0
 NT  2 (0)  0 0
 Not  Australia  7 (0)  2 (3)  1 (1) 
 Unknown  14 (1)  0 0
*Diagnosis received during 7-day period after the cruise. RR, relative risk; CI, confidence interval; –, not applicable; NSW, New South Wales; QLD, 
Queensland; SA, South Australia; WA, Western Australia; ACT, Australian Capital Territory; NT, Northern Territory.  
†Relative risks compared NSW residents with non–NSW residents. Two co-infected case-patients have been counted in both influenza categories. The 2 
case-patients with positive results from point-of-care testing on board but no further subtyping results are excluded from this table. Outbreaks of Inﬂ  uenza on Cruise Ship
of age began receiving antiviral drug prophylaxis within 7 
days of their ﬁ  rst exposure to pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus. Of 
these 20, only 1 received prophylactic drug within 3 days 
of ﬁ  rst exposure to the pandemic strain. Despite being as-
ymptomatic, 11 (27%) of 41 passengers underwent labora-
tory testing and were negative for pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus 
by NAT.
Isolation and Quarantine
After disembarking, patients with pandemic and sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza were isolated in 149 discrete (family or 
household-like) groups. Of the 98 (66%) interviewed, 37% 
reported that they were ﬁ  rst made aware of the need for 
isolation through media reports, 27% by their treating doc-
tor, 26% by public health staff, 6% by the ship’s staff, and 
5% by fellow passengers. Of the 45 quarantined passengers 
interviewed, 52% were initially informed of the need for 
quarantine through media reports, 25% by work or school 
colleagues, 11% from the ship’s staff, 7% from a friend 
or relative, and 5% from public health staff. All inﬂ  uenza 
case-patients reported that they had obeyed isolation re-
quirements, and 43 of 45 quarantined passengers reported 
that they had remained in quarantine for 7 days after dis-
embarkation. Of the 2 passengers who did not follow quar-
antine requirements, 1 reportedly attended work by private 
vehicle and cancelled all other outings; the other denied 
knowledge of the requirements.
Further Virus Transmission
Three secondary pandemic inﬂ  uenza infections among 
family contacts of case-patients from cruise A were identi-
ﬁ  ed; a subsequent case-patient was identiﬁ  ed as a contact 
of 1 person who had secondary infection. Other than these 
cases, no evidence of transmission to the community or to 
passengers of cruise B was found.
Discussion
We identiﬁ  ed dual outbreaks of pandemic and seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza among passengers on a cruise ship. Cruise ships 
provide ideal conditions for rapid spread of respiratory vi-
ral illnesses (e.g., many persons living closely together, fre-
quently interacting in enclosed and partially enclosed envi-
ronments, and often originating from both hemispheres). 
Although infections spread rapidly among passengers and 
to some crew members during the cruise, further spread to 
the community and the next cruise was avoided through 
intensive disease control measures.
After identiﬁ  cation of the outbreak, it became apparent 
that undetected local transmission of pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
virus was occurring in Victoria before cruise A (8) and that 
the virus was probably introduced to the ship by the index 
case-patient from Victoria. The pandemic virus spread rap-
idly among other childcare attendees and their close con-
tacts and to other passengers and crew. Seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
virus was the predominant inﬂ  uenza virus circulating in 
NSW before the appearance of pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus 
(NSW Health, unpub. data).
The cocirculation of both strains in the childcare center 
provided a unique opportunity to compare attack rates. The 
pandemic strain seems to have spread among children more 
readily than the seasonal strain. This difference in transmis-
sibility could have resulted from innate differences in the 
viruses themselves or from a level of immunity from past 
infection with the seasonal strain. Consistent with ﬁ  ndings 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 11, November 2010  1735 
Table 2. Clinical data for 100 passengers with influenza after 10-day cruise that departed Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, on
May 16, 2009 
Clinical data 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, no. (%), 
n = 50* 
Influenza (H3N2), no. (%), 
n = 50†  p value 
Cough 46 (92)  48 (96)  0.40
Fever (self-reported or measured)  39 (78)  34 (68)  0.26
Coryza   39 (78)  28 (56)  0.019 
Fatigue 28 (56)  30 (60)  0.68
Sore throat   27 (54)  31 (62)  0.42
Headache 21 (42)  28 (56)  0.16
Myalgia  19 (38)  23 (46)  0.42
Dyspnea  12 (24)  10 (20)  0.63
Vomiting 5 (10)  4 (8)  0.73
Diarrhea  3 (6)  7 (14)  0.18
Severity of illness 
Limited activities  19 (38)  29‡ (58)  0.011 
Antiinfluenza treatment  12 (24)  19§ (42)  0.06
*Patient median age 25.8 years (range 3–53 years); 20 male and 30 female; median duration of illness 5.0 days (range 0–17 days).
†Patient median age 32.4 years (range 3–82 years); 25 male and 25 female; median duration of illness 7.0 days (range 1–35 days). Duration data from 
45 reinterviewed case-patients. Excludes 5 case-patients for whom symptom data was collected at the time of testing but for whom laboratory results 
confirming influenza subtype H3N2 were not available at the time of reinterview.  
‡Data from 45 reinterviewed case-patients. Excludes 5 case-patients for whom symptom data was collected at the time of testing but for whom laboratory 
results confirming influenza subtype H3N2 were not available at the time of reinterview.  
§Treatment given with 48 hours of symptom onset. RESEARCH
in other studies, the symptoms of pandemic and seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza were similar (9–12). After adjusting for underly-
ing medical conditions, we found that hospitalization rates 
and activity-limiting effects were higher for case-patients 
with seasonal than with pandemic inﬂ  uenza; however, this 
ﬁ  nding may be explained in part by differences in the age-
speciﬁ  c attack rates. The secondary attack rate for pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza among cabin contacts of 55% was higher 
than that reported for household contacts (13,14), despite a 
small proportion of these persons having received antiviral 
drug prophylaxis, and may reﬂ  ect the close living arrange-
ments in a ship’s cabin.
The intense passenger follow-up enabled us to assess 
the sensitivity of the ship’s medical clinic for identifying 
inﬂ   uenza cases. Before this outbreak, ships had active 
containment measures in place to minimize the spread of 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza, including use of point-of-care inﬂ  uenza 
testing for patients seeking treatment for ILI and oseltami-
vir treatment and isolation to reduce further spread. Our 
active case-ﬁ   nding efforts identiﬁ   ed 79 inﬂ  uenza  cases 
on cruise A, yet the ship’s clinic identiﬁ  ed only 6 (8%) 
of these. Despite enhanced community awareness of the 
emerging pandemic, the ship’s medical clinic staff under-
estimated the case count by 13-fold. The number of passen-
gers who sought treatment at the ship’s medical clinic does 
not accurately reﬂ  ect the extent of the inﬂ  uenza outbreak 
on board, possibly because the decision to seek treatment 
may have been inﬂ  uenced by a number of factors including 
cost, severity of symptoms, and unwillingness to be iso-
lated while on holiday.
Our investigation had several limitations. First, the 
case deﬁ  nition depended on NAT detection of virus in 
clinical samples, which may have resulted in misclassiﬁ  ca-
tion of cases. Second, although the epidemiology is con-
sistent with the ﬁ  rst cases of pandemic inﬂ  uenza appear-
ing in the childcare center, undetected or asymptomatic 
infected passengers or crew could have carried the viruses 
onto the ship. However, this scenario is unlikely because 
the symptoms developed in the index case-patient 2 days 
after embarkation. Third, although most ill passengers were 
interviewed within 2 days after onset of illness, interviews 
about severity, length of illness, and the experience in iso-
lation and quarantine were conducted some weeks later, 
introducing possible recall bias. Fourth, although 2 cases 
of co-infection were detected, only the ﬁ  rst 2 pandemic in-
ﬂ  uenza–positive specimens from childcare attendees were 
subtyped for other inﬂ  uenza A subtypes; it is possible that 
some of the remaining pandemic inﬂ  uenza case-patients 
were also infected with seasonal inﬂ  uenza. Fifth, some of 
the remaining pandemic inﬂ  uenza case-patients may have 
been co-infected. Sixth, the secondary attack rate for cabin 
contacts may be an overestimate because passengers with 
negative NAT results were not tested for other respiratory 
infections, and passengers with onset of symptoms >24 
hours after symptoms developed in a cabinmate were as-
sumed to be secondary, rather than co-primary cases.
Mathematical modeling suggests that containment of 
inﬂ  uenza is possible if appropriate resources are devot-
ed. In some countries, isolation and quarantine measures 
have been used in response to severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (15–18), but these measures have rarely been 
used for inﬂ  uenza control. In the inﬂ  uenza outbreaks re-
ported here, direct follow-up of passengers in isolation 
and quarantine, supported by intense media coverage, re-
sulted in a high degree of compliance and successful out-
break containment. Additionally, providing oseltamivir 
prophylaxis for crew members may have contributed to 
the successful containment of the infection during cruise 
B. Although the robust application of containment mea-
sures can stop the spread of novel inﬂ  uenza viruses, pub-
lic health resource requirements are labor-intensive and 
expensive and may not be sustainable except for the most 
virulent of pandemic viruses.
Acknowledgments
We thank Kerry Chant, Lisa Coombs, Polly Wallace, and the 
staff of the jurisdictional public health network and NSW public 
health units and laboratories.
Dr Ward is an epidemiologist and manager of surveillance in 
the Communicable Diseases Branch at New South Wales Health. 
Her research interests include risk factors for pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
and the epidemiology of HIV, blood-borne viruses, and sexually 
transmitted infections.
1736  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 11, November 2010
Figure. Date of onset of ﬁ  rst symptoms for cruise ship passengers, 
by inﬂ  uenza subtype. Excludes 1 inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) case-patient 
for whom onset date was unavailable and 1 pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
case-patient and 2 inﬂ   uenza A (H3N2) case-patients who were 
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